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Abstract
This note examines strategic import policies in a three-country model with vertical
production and trade relationship. Reflecting horizontal and vertical effects of the import
policy, each country's optimal policy can be either tariff or subsidy, depending on the relative
numbers of upstream and downstream firms.
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Along with the growing importance of international trade in intermediate goods in
the world economy 1, models of strategic trade policy with vertically related markets
have been developed in recent years. Using variants of the third-market oligopoly model
originated by Brander and Spencer (1985), the existing studies have shown that a down-
stream country’s optimal policy is inﬂuenced not only by the horizontal proﬁt-shifting
motive but also by the motive to extract proﬁts from upstream ﬁrms (Bernhofen, 1997;
Ishikawa and Spencer, 1999; Chang and Sugeta, 2004).
The existing studies have examined optimal export policies. In this paper, by con-
trast, we focus on optimal import policies 2. Moreover, instead of the third-market
models that existing studies have analyzed, we consider a three-country model, in which
a homogenous ﬁnal good is produced in two countries using an imported intermediate
good, and the intermediate good is produced in another country that also consumes the
ﬁnal good 3. We show that each country’s optimal unilateral policy can be either tariﬀ
or subsidy, depending on the relative numbers of upstream and downstream ﬁrms, which
reﬂect horizontal and vertical eﬀects of the import policy. We also show that when the
optimal policy for a country exporting the intermediate good and importing the ﬁnal
good is a tariﬀ (subsidy), the optimal policy is a subsidy (tariﬀ) for its trading partner.
We consider a policy game as well as the unilateral policy choice, and derive the similar
result.
2 The Model
The world economy consists of three countries (A, B and C), where a ﬁnal good and an
intermediate good are traded in addition to a numeraire good that balances trade. There
are n > 1 identical ﬁrms producing the ﬁnal good in country B and C, respectively, while
no downstream ﬁrms in country A. The intermediate good, by contrast, is produced only
in country A, which has m > 1 identical ﬁrms. Moreover, we assume that consumption
of the ﬁnal good only takes place in country A. Therefore, the trade pattern is that
country A exports the intermediate good to country B and C, and the ﬁnal good is
traded in the opposite direction.
Let us denote the tariﬀ rate on the ﬁnal good by TA, and that on the intermediate
good imposed by the government in country i = B,C by ti
4. The model involves three
stages of action. In stage 1, governments determine the tariﬀ rates. In stage 2, the
1For example, the trade values of intermediate goods from Japan and NIEs to China and ASEAN
grew from $ 24 billion in 1990 to $182 billion in 2003 (METI, 2006).
2Although Ishikawa and Spencer (1999) examined the import policy applied to intermediate goods,
their main focus is on the strategic export policies.
3The eﬀects of tariﬀs on intermediate and ﬁnal goods in a two-country model with a foreign vertically
integrated ﬁrm are examined by Spencer and Jones (1992) and Ishikawa and Lee (1997).
4We assume that discriminatory tariﬀs on ﬁnal goods are not applied because of the principle of
most-favored-nation treatment.
1upstream ﬁrms located in country A play a Cournot game to choose output, and the
intermediate goods are sold to country B and C. In stage 3, given the prices of the
intermediate good, the downstream ﬁrms located in country B and C play a Cournot
game in country A’s market to choose output. 5 We solve the model backwards.
2.1 Stage 3: Cournot competition by ﬁnal-good ﬁrms
We assume that producing one unit of the ﬁnal good requires one unit of the intermediate
good. Then, a representative ﬁrm in country i = B,C chooses the output yi so as to
maximize the proﬁt
πi = [P(Y ) − ri − TA]yi, i = B,C, (1)
taking ri and other (both domestic and foreign) ﬁrms’ output as given, where P(Y ):
inverse demand, Y : total output, and ri: price of the intermediate good. The Cournot-
Nash equilibrium in the ﬁnal-good market is characterized by the following conditions
6:
P(nyB + nyC) + P
′(nyB + nyC)yB = rB + TA, (2)
P(nyB + nyC) + P
′(nyB + nyC)yC = rC + TA. (3)
These conditions deﬁne the equilibrium outputs yi = ˜ yi(rB,rC,TA), i = B,C.
Let Xi be the total supply of the intermediate good in country i = B,C. The
market-clearing conditions XB = n˜ yB(rB,rC,TA) and XC = n˜ yC(rB,rC,TA) derive the
inverse demand functions of the intermediate goods; ri = ˜ ri(XB,XC,TA), i = B,C.
2.2 Stage 2: Cournot competition by intermediate-good ﬁrms
With a constant marginal cost of producing the intermediate good k > 0, a representa-
tive ﬁrm in country A earns proﬁts
πA = [˜ r
B(X
B,X
C,TA) − k − tB]x
B
A + [˜ r
C(X
B,X




A: the ﬁrm’s supply of the intermediate good to country i’s market. The ﬁrm
determines xB
A and xC
A so as to maximize (4), taking other ﬁrms’ output as given. 7 In the
5Models of vertical Cournot oligopolies, in which upstream and downstream ﬁrms are respectively
under Cournot competition, are widely examined in the literature of industrial organization (e.g.,
Greenhut and Ohta, 1979; Salinger, 1988; Lin, 2006) and trade theory (e.g., Bernhofen, 1995, 1997;
Spencer and Raubitschek, 1996; Ishikawa and Lee, 1997; Ishikawa and Spencer, 1999). The assumption
that the downstream ﬁrms recognize their market power in the ﬁnal good market, but act as price-
takers in the input market, may be subject to criticism. However, as Ishikawa and Spencer (1999,
pp. 204–205) justiﬁes, the downstream ﬁrms’ monopsony power becomes vanishingly small when the
number of these ﬁrms increases or when a large number of identical downstream industries demand the
same input and our downstream industry is a ‘representative’ one.
6Eqs. (2) and (3) follow from the ﬁnal-good ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions for proﬁt maximization.
7If the upstream ﬁrms play a Bertrand game, they reduce the price of the intermediate good to the
marginal cost plus the tariﬀ rate (ri = k + ti. i = B,C) because the intermediate goods are assumed





























A = 0. (6)
These conditions jointly determine the equilibrium outputs of the intermediates as a
function of the tariﬀ rates; xi
A = xi(TA,tB,tC), i = B,C.
Substituting xi(TA,tB,tC) into the equilibrium outputs and prices in stage 3, we
have the subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions as a function of tariﬀ rates:
r
i(TA,tB,tC) ≡ ˜ r
i(mx
B(TA,tB,tC),mx
C(TA,tB,tC),TA), i = B,C,
y
i(TA,tB,tC) ≡ ˜ y
i(r
B(TA,tB,tC),r
C(TA,tB,tC),TA), i = B,C,
p(TA,tB,tC) ≡ P(Y (TA,tB,tC)),
where Y (TA,tB,tC) ≡
P
i=B,C n˜ yi(rB(TA,tB,tC),rC(TA,tB,tC),TA).
We assume a linear demand: P(Y ) = α − Y , where α > 0 is large enough to
ensure positive outputs. Then, uniqueness and stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
in both ﬁnal- and intermediate-goods markets are guaranteed, and the second-order
conditions for proﬁt maximization and welfare maximization (in the next section) are
































































(2n + 1)(m + 1)
> 0, (7d)
i,j = B,C, j ̸= i. An increase in TA raises marginal costs of ﬁnal-good producers,
whose output decreases and so does Y , leading to increased p. The reduction of ﬁnal-
good outputs reduces demand for intermediate goods xi, the price of which ri declines
so as to avoid further shrinking in demand. An increase in ti raises marginal costs of
intermediate-good producers, whose output is reduced, leading to increased ri. This
price increase reduces yi and augments the rival’s output yj, but the total supply of the
ﬁnal good decrease, and hence p rises.
to be homogeneous. This implies that country B and C cannot reduce their respective import price of
the intermediate good, which contributes to an improvement in their terms of trade, by raising tariﬀs.
33 Strategic Import Policies
3.1 Optimal import policy for country A
Country A’s welfare consists of the sum of consumer surplus, proﬁts of the intermediate-















The government in country A chooses TA so as to maximize (8), taking tB and tC as




(m − 2n − 1)(2α − 2k − tB − tC)
4m(n + 1)
. (9)
Proposition 1 The optimal unilateral policy for country A is an import tariﬀ (resp.
subsidy) if and only if m − 2n − 1 > 0 (resp. m − 2n − 1 < 0).
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Starting from free trade, an increase







































The proﬁt-capturing eﬀect indicates that by raising TA, country A can extract the prof-
its of foreign ﬁnal-good ﬁrms in the form of increased tariﬀ revenue net of deterioration
in its terms of trade. Meanwhile, an increase in TA reduces yi, which shrinks demand
for intermediate goods and hence home ﬁrms’ proﬁts. This reduction in πA does not
contribute to any gain in πi, i = B,C, and hence we call this an eﬃciency-loss eﬀect.
Both the proﬁt-capturing and eﬃciency-loss eﬀects stem from the vertical trade struc-
ture. If m is large, the proﬁt-capturing eﬀect is reinforced while the eﬃciency-loss eﬀect
diminishes, both enhance country A’s welfare. If n is large, the proﬁt-capturing eﬀect
diminishes, which reduces welfare.
8We make use of the market-clearing condition for intermediate goods mxi = nyi and comparative
static results (7).
43.2 Optimal import policy for country B and C
As for country B and C, their welfare consists of the sum of proﬁts of the ﬁnal-good
ﬁrms, and tariﬀ revenue:
Wi = n[p(TA,tB,tC) − r
i(TA,tB,tC) − TA]y
i(TA,tB,tC) + mtix
i(TA,tB,tC), i = B,C.
(11)
Country B (C) chooses tB (tC) so as to maximize (11), taking TA and tC (tB) as given.




(2n + 1 − m)(α + ntj − k − TA)
2(n + 1)[(m + 2)n + 1]
, i,j = B,C,j ̸= i. (12)
Proposition 2 The optimal unilateral policy for country B and C is an import tariﬀ
(resp. subsidy) if and only if m − 2n − 1 < 0 (resp. m − 2n − 1 > 0).
The optimal policy is dependent on the sign of m − 2n − 1, as in Proposition 1,
but the condition is opposite to that for country A. The intuition is as follows. From



























mn + 2n + 1
(2n + 1)(m + 1)
−
m(n + 1)




The surplus-capturing eﬀect represents the extraction of country A’s consumers surplus
and proﬁts by country i. The proﬁt-shifting eﬀect is in the horizontal sense that, e.g.,
an increase in tB raises rB and hence the ﬁrms in country C has a cost advantage over
country B’s ﬁrms. If m is large, the surplus-capturing eﬀect diminishes while the proﬁt-
shifting eﬀect is reinforced, and hence the total welfare eﬀect is negative. If n is large,
the opposite holds.
3.3 Policy game
When we consider a noncooperative policy game, the Nash equilibrium tariﬀ rates are




(m − 2n − 1)(n + 1)(α − k)






(2n + 1 − m)(α − k)
m[2n(n + 2) + 1] + 2n + 1
. (14)
The results under unilateral actions apply to the policy game.
Proposition 3 In the Nash equilibrium of the policy game, country A uses import tariﬀ
(resp. subsidy) while country B and C use import subsidy (resp. tariﬀ) if and only if
m > 2n + 1 (resp. m < 2n + 1).
54 Conclusion
This paper examined a three country model with a vertical production and trade struc-
ture, and derived each country’s optimal import policy. Depending on the relative
numbers of upstream and downstream ﬁrms, each country’s optimal policy can be ei-
ther tariﬀ or subsidy. Moreover, when the optimal policy for a country exporting the
intermediate good and importing the ﬁnal good is a tariﬀ (subsidy), the optimal policy
is a subsidy (tariﬀ) for its trading partner.
In the current world economy, there have been active movements toward expanding
and deepening regional integration. Given such movements, it will be interesting to
examine the eﬀects of preferential trade agreement in our three-country model. This
will be our next task.
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